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Abstract
The model in this paper gives a convenient strategy that one bank in the federal
funds market can use in order to maximize its profit in a contemporaneous reserve
requirement (CRR) regime. The reserve requirements are determined by the demand
deposit process, modelled as a Brownian motion with drift. We propose a new model
in which the cumulative funds purchases and sales are discounted at possible different
rates. We formulate and solve the bank problem of finding the optimal strategy. The
model can be extended to involve the bank’s asset size and we obtain that, under some
conditions, the optimal upper barrier for selling is a linear function of the asset size.
As a consequence, the net purchase amount turns to be linear in the asset size.
1 Introduction
One of the threats perceived as being brought by a financial crisis on economy is the lack of
liquidity. Because of this threat, in 2008, big banks received help from the Federal Reserve
Bank through public money, whereas small banks were let to default or to be acquired
by other banks. It was argued that the bailouts were necessary because a big bank’s
default might be followed by a lack of liquidity in the market and, thus, by a cascade of
defaults. However, letting small banks to fail and helping the big ones to become bigger
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leads to a market which is even more concentrated and to bigger liquidity problems in
a future financial crisis, as the Nobel prize winner J. Stieglitz points out in [11]. It is
of great interest, therefore, a thorough study of the connection between bank’s market
concentration and some measure of liquidity. Our model puts in evidence the net purchase
amount as a function of the bank’s assets.
Since the link between liquidity and market concentration is important both for the
regulator and for the market players, we take into account macro policies regarding bank’s
activities. The latter are first implemented in the federal funds market, which incorporates
all the transactions involving federal funds. Therefore, it is worthwhile to take in consider-
ation the particularities of the federal funds market, even in a stylized way. An interesting
problem would be if the model could put in evidence this so-called small bank- large bank
dichotomy.
The one bank problem from this paper involves an economy with only one bank and
the Federal Reserve Bank. We assume that the bank is a price-taker in the federal funds
market and can obtain sufficient funds from the Federal Reserve Bank. The bank’s task is
to derive an optimal transaction amount to minimize the cost of buying and selling (actually
borrowing and lending) overnight federal funds, while meeting the reserve requirements in
a CRR regime. We ignore long-term time deposits and we assume that the bank’s only
source of funds are demand deposits and federal funds. A percent of the deposits need to
be kept as reserves in the bank’s account with the Fed. The difference between the deposits
and the required reserves represent the excess reserves, which can be used by the bank for
the transactions in the federal funds market. We consider that during the business day,
the bank can increase/decrease its level of federal funds through direct transactions, which
involve transaction costs.
The model of this paper extends the optimal control problem of [2] and [6], by allowing
for the transactions to be discounted at possibly different rates. We formulate and solve
the problem by giving the optimal value function and the optimal strategy. A different
approach is to use the entropy maximization as in [9], [10].
As in [1] and [2], our model gives an optimal net purchase amount as an output, using
the martingale/ supermartingale principle (see e.g. [8]) and the double Skorokhod formula.
The model is based on the asset size as in [3]. We obtain that the net purchase amount
is increasing in the asset size. Anecdotally, large banks were known to be buyers of funds
whereas small, risk averse banks were known to be sellers of funds (see [4], [12]). Therefore,
our model puts in evidence this so called small bank large bank dichotomy.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and the main
assumptions. In Section 3 we give the problem formulation and present the objective of
the paper. In Section 4 we present the main results and discuss a particular interesting
case. The paper ends with an an appendix containing the proofs.
2
2 The model
Let us consider the problem of a bank which has an exogenously given demand deposit
(net of withdrawals) and continuously sells and buys funds, thus lowering or increasing the
excess reserves, defined as the difference between deposits and required reserves.
The bank is characterized by:
1. A demand deposit process (Dt)t≥0.
2. A required reserve process (Rt)t≥0, where Rt = qDt.
3. An excess reserve process Xt = (1− q)Dt.
Therefore, modelling the deposits D is equivalent to modelling the excess reserves X.
Let (Ω,F, Px) be a probability space rich enough to accommodate a standard, one-
dimensional, Brownian motion B = (Bt, 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞).
Let us consider the problem of a bank which has an exogenous demand deposits (net of
withdrawals) and continuously sell and buy funds, thus lowering or increasing the demand
deposits. The demand deposits X = (Xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞) are assumed to fluctuate over time
as follows
dXt = µdt+ σdBt. (1)
We consider F = (Ft)t≥0 to be the completion of the augmented filtration generated
by X (so that (Ft) satisfies the usual conditions).
Therefore, the bank observes nothing except the sample path of X.
2.1 Policies
Definition 2.1. A policy is defined as a pair of processes L and U such that
L,U are F− adapted, right-continuous, increasing and positive. (2)
In the context of the federal funds market, Lt and Ut are the cumulative funds purchases
and funds sales (from the central bank) that the bank undertakes up to time t, in order to
satisfy the reserve requirements and to maximize its profit. Let us take λ1 and λ2, λ1 ≥ λ2
be interest rates at which the bank lends and borrows funds. A controlled process associated
to the policy (L,U) is a process Z = X + L− U . Using formula (1) for X, we obtain the
decomposition of Z into its continuous part and its finite variation part:
dZt = µdt+ σdBt + dLt − dUt. (3)
In our model Zt is the amount of excess funds in the bank’s reserve account at time t. The
policy (L,U) is said to be feasible if
L0− = U0− = 0, (4)
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Px {Zt ≥ 0,∀t} = 1,∀x ≥ 0, (5)
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λitdL
]
<∞,∀x ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, (6)
and
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tdU
]
<∞,∀x ≥ 0. (7)
We denote by S(x) the set of all feasible policies associated with the continuous process X
that starts at x.
2.2 Transaction Costs
We assume that the bank can continuously sell and buy funds, thus lowering or increasing
its excess reserve account.
It is considered, as in [3], that there are three types of transaction costs:
1. A proportional transaction cost α of buying funds.
2. A proportional transaction cost β of selling federal funds.1
3. A continuous holding cost, incurred at the rate h.
3 The Problem Formulation
3.1 The Cost Function
Definition 3.1. The cost function associated to the feasible policy (L,U) is
kL,U (x) ≡ Ex
[∫ ∞
0
[e−λ1t(hZtdt+ βdU) + (ne
−λ1t + (1− n)e−λ2t)αdL]
]
, x ≥ 0, (8)
with n ∈ [0, 1].
Remark 1. The cumulative funds purchases and funds sales are discounted at possible
different rates. If n = 1 then the discounting occur at the same rate λ1. The discount
function ne−λ1t+(1−n)e−λ2t, n ∈ [0, 1] was considered in [5] and leads to a time changing
discount rate in [λ2, λ1].
1The proportional adjustment costs, α and β, are due to ‘spreads between bid and ask prices, brokerage
fees, the lack of availability of a transaction partner and other service charges which vary with the volume
of the transaction’, as in [3]and [4].
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3.2 The Objective
The bank’s reserve management and profit-making problem is to find the optimal strategy
(Lˆ, Uˆ ) which minimizes the cost.
Definition 3.2. The control (Lˆ, Uˆ ) is said to be optimal if k
Lˆ,Uˆ
(x) is minimal among the
cost functions kL,U (x) associated with feasible policies (L,U), for each fixed x ≥ 0.
The problem of minimizing the cost can be translated to the task of maximizing a
value function. This function is easier to work with and it turns out to have particular
characteristics, when the policy is of a barrier type. We present the relation between the
cost function and the gain function obtained in [6].
3.3 The Gain Function
Definition 3.3. The gain function is defined by
vL,U (x) ≡ Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ1t(rdU − cdL)
}
− Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ2t(1− n)αdL
}
, x ≥ 0, (9)
where r ≡ h/λ1 − β, and c ≡ h/λ1 + nα.
Then extending the arguments from [6] one gets the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The relation between the cost function and the gain function is
kL,U(x) = hx/λ1 + hµ/λ
2
1 − vL,U (x), x ≥ 0. (10)
4 The Optimal Policies
4.1 The Barrier Policies
Let b > 0 be a real fixed number. We consider that X0 = x ∈ [0, b]. If X0 > b, then we
allow a jump at 0 for U : U0 = X0 − b.
Definition 4.1. The barrier policies are the set of policies (L,U) ∈ S(x) that satisfy:
1. (L,U) continuous on (0,∞), increasing, L0− = U0− = 0,
2. Zt ≡ Xt + Lt − Ut ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0,
3.
∫ t
0 IZt>0dLt = 0,
∫ t
0 IZt<bdUt = 0.
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A barrier policy (L,U) satisfies:
Lt = sup
0≤s≤t
(Xs − Us)
−, Ut = sup
0≤s≤t
(b−Xs − Ls)
−, (11)
where x− denotes the negative part of x. Moreover, the Double Skorokhod Formula ob-
tained in [7] can be translated into a formula for the bank’s transaction amount L−U , as
shown in [2]:
Lt − Ut = −[(X0 − b)
+ ∧ inf
u∈[0,t]
Xu] ∨ sup
s∈[0,t]
[(Xs − b) ∧ inf
u∈[s,t]
Xu]. (12)
4.2 The Optimal Policy
Let −γ1, γ¯1 be the roots of σ
2γ2/2 + µγ − λ1 = 0,
γ1 ≡
√
µ2 + 2σ2λ1 + µ
σ2
> 0, (13)
γ¯1 ≡
√
µ2 + 2σ2λ1 − µ
σ2
> 0. (14)
Define
g(x) ≡ γ1e
γ¯1x + γ¯1e
−γ1x. (15)
Then g(0) > 0, g′(0) = 0, and g is strictly decreasing and continuous on (−∞, 0]. Hence
there must be a point −b < 0 such that
g(−b) = g(0)c/r. (16)
Let γ2 the positive root of σ
2γ2/2 + µγ − λ2 = 0,
γ2 ≡
√
µ2 + 2σ2λ2 − µ
σ2
> 0. (17)
Define
v1(x) ≡
{ r
g′(b)g(x) +
c
g′(−b)g(x − b) if 0 ≤ x ≤ b
v1(b) + (x− b)r if x > b.
(18)
and
v2(x) ≡ −
(1− n)α
γ2
e−γ2x. (19)
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Proposition 1. The barrier policy (Lˆ, Uˆ) associated with b of (16) is admissible, i.e.,
(Lˆ, Uˆ ) ∈ S(x). Moreover
v1(x) = Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ1t(rdUˆ − cdLˆ)
}
, x ≥ 0, (20)
v2(x) = −Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ2t(1− n)αdLˆ
}
, x ≥ 0. (21)
Therefore
v
Lˆ,Uˆ
(x) = v1(x) + v2(x). (22)
4.3 Main Result
The following is the main result of our paper.
Theorem 1. The barrier policy (Lˆ, Uˆ) associated with b of (16) is optimal, i.e., for every
(L,U) ∈ S(x),
vL,U (x) ≤ vLˆ,Uˆ (x). (23)
4.4 Special Case
Let us take n = 1 so that we have same discount rate λ1. Moreover, let the drift µ and
volatility σ depend on the bank size A. Inspired by [2] we take µ and σ linear in A, i.e.,
µ = k1A, σ = k2A.
Corollary 1. The barrier b is linear in the bank size A. Consequently, L−U is increasing
in the bank size A.
Remark 2. This result can be used by a bank to develop a strategy for selling funds when
its controlled excess reserve process hits this upper optimal barrier b, i.e. a certain percent
of its asset’s size. This corollary is consistent with the so called small bank large bank
dichotomy, meaning that the bigger the size of the bank, the larger the net purchase amount
that the bank undertakes.
5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Wlog, we can assume that U0 = L0 = 0 (the other cases are similar, given (6)).
Since Z ≡ X + L− U , we have:
hEx
(∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tZtdt
)
= hEx
(∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tXtdt
)
+ hEx
(∫ ∞
0
e−λ1t(Lt − Ut)dt
)
. (24)
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Applying Fubini’s theorem, we obtain:
Ex
(∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tXtdt
)
=
∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tEx(Xt)dt.
We know that sinceX is a (µ, σ) Brownian motion, Ex(Xt) = x+µt and a simple integration
gives the following: ∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tEx(Xt)dt = x/λ1 + µ/λ
2
1.
From the last two formulas we conclude that
Ex
(∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tXtdt
)
= x/λ1 + µ/λ
2
1. (25)
Next, we recall the Riemann- Stieltjes integration by parts theorem, which states that if
two functions f, g are FV (of finite variation), then:
∫ t
0
fdg = f(t)g(t)− f(0)g(0) −
∫ t
0
g(s)df(s).
Noticing that since L is increasing, L is FV and applying the above-mentioned theorem,
we obtain, for each fixed T > 0 and for general λ > 0:
∫ T
0
e−λtdL = e−λTLT + λ
∫ T
0
e−λtLtdt. (26)
Applying Fatou’s lemma twice, (26) and (6), we obtain
Ex[lim inf
T→∞
(e−λTLT + λ
∫ T
0
e−λtLtdt)] = Ex[lim inf
T→∞
Ex
∫ T
0
e−λtdL] ≤ lim inf
T→∞
Ex
∫ T
0
e−λtdL
≤ lim sup
T→∞
Ex
∫ T
0
e−λtdL ≤ Ex lim sup
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−λtdL
= Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−λtdL <∞.
It follows that e−λtLt → 0 almost surely as t→∞. Indeed, if this were not true, then,
since e−λtLt ≥ 0 on a set of non-zero measure, we would have
∫∞
0 e
−λtLtdt = ∞. We
obtain therefore that
Ex[lim infT→∞(e
−λTLT + λ
∫ T
0 e
−λtLtdt)] becomes unbounded, and we get to a contradic-
tion.
Letting T →∞ in (26) and then taking Ex on both sides, we obtain for every λ > 0:
Ex
(∫ ∞
0
e−λtLtdt
)
=
1
λ
Ex
(∫ ∞
0
e−λtdL
)
. (27)
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We obtain a similar equation for U . Replacing it and (27) (for both λ1 and λ2), (25), (24)
in the definition (8) for kL,U (x), we obtain:
kL,U (x) = h(
x
λ1
+
µ
λ21
) + (
h
λ1
+ nα)Ex
(∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tdLt
)
+ (−
h
λ1
+ β)Ex
(∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tdUt
)
+ (1− n)Ex
(∫ ∞
0
e−λ2tαdLt
)
.
5.2 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If u : R → R is a function of class C2 (i.e. twice continuously differentiable), we
denote by Γ the generator of the continuous diffusion process X in (1):
Γu = µu′ +
σ2
2
u′′. (28)
Since Z = X + Lˆ− Uˆ then
dv1(Zt) = σv
′
1(Z)dBt + [Γv1(Z)dt+ v
′
1(0)dLˆ− v
′
1(b)dUˆ ]. (29)
Indeed by Ito’s Lemma combined with the fact that Lˆ increases only when Z = 0, whereas
Uˆ increases only when Z = b yields:
dv1(Zt) = v
′
1(Zt)dZt + 1/2v
′′
1 (Zt)(dZt)
2
= v′1(Z)(dX + dLˆ− dUˆ) +
1
2
σ2v′′1 (Z)dt
= v′1(Z)(µdt+ σdBt + dLˆt − dUˆt) +
1
2
σ2v′′1(Z)dt
= σv′1(Z)dBt + Γv1(Z)dt+ v
′
1(0)dLˆ − v
′
1(b)dUˆ .
Since Z is bounded a.s. then e−λsv′1(Z) is bounded a.s., thus the processMt ≡
∫ t
0 e
−λsv′1(Zt)σdBt, t ≥
0 is a martingale. Consequently
ExMt = 0.
From the definition of v1 we infer that
Γv1(z) = λ1v1(z), z ∈ [0, b], v
′
1(0) = c, v
′
1(b) = r.
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Applying integration by parts leads to:
e−λ1tv1(Zt) = v1(Z0) +
∫ t
0
e−λ1sdv1(Z)− λ1
∫ t
0
e−λ1sv1(Z)ds
= v1(Z0) +Mt +
∫ t
0
e−λ1s[Γv1(Z)ds+ v
′
1(0)dLˆ − v
′
1(b)dUˆ ]− λ1
∫ t
0
e−λ1sv1(Z)ds
= v1(Z0) +Mt +
∫ t
0
e−λ1s[Γv1(Z)− λ1v1(Z)]ds −
∫ t
0
e−λ1s[v′1(b)dUˆ − v
′
1(0)dLˆ]
= v1(Z0) +Mt −
∫ t
0
e−λ1s[rdUˆ − cdLˆ].
By taking expectation, then letting t→∞, and using that v1 is bounded leads to
v1(x) = Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ1t(rdUˆ − cdLˆ)
}
. (30)
Let Z¯ = X + Lˆ then
dv2(Z¯t) = σv
′
2(Z¯)dBt + [Γv2(Z¯)dt+ v
′
2(0)dLˆ]. (31)
Indeed by Ito’s Lemma combined with the fact that Lˆ increases only when Z = 0 yields:
dv2(Z¯t) = v
′
2(Z¯t)dZ¯t + 1/2v
′′
2 (Z¯t)(dZ¯t)
2
= v′2(Z¯)(dX + dLˆ) +
1
2
σ2v′′2 (Z¯)dt
= v′2(Z¯)(µdt+ σdBt + dLˆt) +
1
2
σ2v′′2 (Z¯)dt
= σv′2(Z¯)dBt + Γv2(Z¯)dt+ v
′
2(0)dLˆ.
Since Z¯ is positive a.s. then e−λsv′2(Z¯) is bounded a.s., thus the processNt ≡
∫ t
0 e
−λsv′2(Z¯t)σdBt, t ≥
0 is a martingale. Consequently
ExNt = 0.
From the definition of v2 we infer that
Γv2 = λ2v2, v
′
2(0) = (1− n)α.
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Applying integration by parts leads to:
e−λ2tv2(Z¯t) = v2(Z¯0) +
∫ t
0
e−λ2sdv2(Z¯)− λ2
∫ t
0
e−λ2sv2(Z¯)ds
= v2(Z¯0) +Nt +
∫ t
0
e−λ2s[Γv2(Z¯)ds+ v
′
2(0)dLˆ]− λ2
∫ t
0
e−λ2sv2(Z¯)ds
= v2(Z¯0) +Nt +
∫ t
0
e−λ2s[Γv2(Z¯)− λ2v2(Z¯)]ds −
∫ t
0
e−λ2s[−v′2(0)dLˆ]
= v2(Z0) +Nt −
∫ t
0
e−λ2s[(n − 1)αdLˆ].
By taking expectation, then letting t→∞, and using that v1 is bounded on R
+ leads
to
v2(x) = −Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ2t(1− n)αdLˆ
}
. (32)
Next let us check the feasibility of the policy (Lˆ, Uˆ), i.e.,
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λitdLˆ
]
<∞,∀x ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, (33)
and
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tdUˆ
]
<∞,∀x ≥ 0. (34)
From (32) we get
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λ2tdLˆ
]
<∞. (35)
Moreover
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λ1td[Lˆ− Uˆ ]
]
= Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λ1td[Z −X]
]
<∞,∀x ≥ 0, (36)
combined with (30) yield
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tdLˆ
]
<∞, Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−λ1tdUˆ
]
<∞. (37)
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5.3 Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The idea of the proof is based on the martingale/supermartingale principle. In a
first step we show that some processes are supermartingales.
Lemma 2. For every (L,U) ∈ S(x), with Z = X + L− U, the process
e−λ1tv1(Zt) +
∫ t
0
e−λ1s[rdU − cdL], t ≥ 0
is supermartingale. Moreover with Z¯ = X + L, the process
e−λ2tv2(Z¯t) +
∫ t
0
e−λ2s[(n− 1)]αdL, , t ≥ 0
is supermartingale.
Therefore for a fixed T > 0, by taking expectations we get
Ex
{∫ T
0
e−λ1t(rdU − cdL)
}
≤ v1(x)− Ex[e
−λ1T v1(ZT )].
Next, the positivity of Z, the linearity of v1(z) for large z, the integrability conditions (6),
(7) and Dominated Convergence Theorem yield that
Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ1t(rdU − cdL)
}
≤ v1(x).
Similarly
Ex
{∫ T
0
e−λ2t(n − 1)dL)
}
≤ v2(x)− Ex[e
−λ2T v2(Z¯T )].
The positivity of Z¯, the roundedness of v1(z) for positive z, the integrability condition (6).
and Dominated Convergence Theorem yield that
Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ2t(n− 1)dL)
}
≤ v2(x).
By adding these inequalities we get
Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−λ1t(rdU − cdL)
}
− Ex
{∫ T
0
e−λ2t(1− n)dL)
}
≤ v1(x) + v2(x).
However by Proposition 1
v
Lˆ,Uˆ
(x) = v1(x) + v2(x),
which proves optimality of (Lˆ, Uˆ )
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5.3.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that
Γv1(z) = λ1v1(z), z ∈ [0, b], v
′
1(0) = c, v
′
1(b) = r. (38)
Moreover
Γv1(z) ≤ λ1v1(z), r ≤ v
′
1(z) ≤ c, z ≥ 0. (39)
By Ito’s Lemma for processes with jumps
d
(
e−λ1tv1(Zt) +
∫ t
0
e−λ1s[rdU − cdL]
)
= e−λ1t(Γv1 − λv1)(Z)dt
+ e−λ1t(v′1(Z)− c)dL˜+ e
−λ1t(r − v′1(Z))dU˜
+
∑
0≤s≤t
e−λs(∆v1(Z)s − c∆Ls + r∆Us),
where dL˜ = dL−∆L and dU˜ = dU −∆U. In the light of (39) the claim yield if we prove
that ∑
0≤s≤t
e−λs(∆v1(Z)s − c∆Ls + r∆Us) ≤ 0.
Suppose that ∆Lt > 0 and ∆Ut = 0 (the other cases are similar). Then ∆Zt = ∆Lt and
∆v1(Z)t − c∆Lt + r∆Ut = v1(Zt)− v1(Zt −∆Lt)− c∆Lt.
The last quantity is negative because v′1(z) ≤ c, z ≥ 0. Recall that
Γv2 = λ2v2, v
′
2(0) = (1− n)α. (40)
Moreover
v′2(z) ≤ (1− n)α, z ≥ 0. (41)
By Ito’s Lemma for processes with jumps
d
(
e−λ2tv2(Z¯t) +
∫ t
0
e−λ2s[(n− 1)]αdL
)
= e−λ2t(Γv2 − λv1)(Z¯)dt
+ e−λ2t(v′2(Z¯)− (1− n)α)dL˜+
+
∑
0≤s≤t
e−λs(∆v2(Z¯)s − (1− n)α∆Ls),
In the light of (41) the claim yield if we prove that∑
0≤s≤t
e−λs(∆v2(Z¯)s − (1− n)α∆Ls) ≤ 0.
Suppose that ∆Lt > 0, then ∆Z¯t = ∆Lt and
∆v2(Z)t − (1− n)α∆Lt = v2(Zt)− v2(Zt −∆Lt)− (1− n)α∆Lt.
The last quantity is negative because v′2(z) ≤ (1− n)α, z ≥ 0.
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5.4 Appendix D: Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. In light of µ = k1A, σ = k2A, and
γ1 ≡
√
µ2 + 2σ2λ1 + µ
σ2
, (42)
γ¯1 ≡
√
µ2 + 2σ2λ1 − µ
σ2
, (43)
it follows that γ1 = a1A, γ¯1 = a¯1A, for some constants a1, a¯1. Recall that
g(x) ≡ γ1e
γ¯1x + γ¯1e
−γ1x,
whence
g(−b)
g(0)
= F
(
b
A
)
,
for some function F. From (16) it follows that b should solve
F
(
b
A
)
= c/r. (44)
Therefore b = kA, for some positive constant k.
Given X0 ∈ [0, b], then (X0 − b)
+ = 0, The Double Skorokhod Formula (see [7]) yields
that L− U is increasing in the barrier b. Since b = kA, for some positive constant k, then
L− U is increasing in the bank size A.
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